The New Scramble for Somalia: The Role of Diaspora Somalis with Dual Citizenship

The New Scramble for Somalia: The Role of Diaspora Somalis with Dual Citizenship


Hassan A. Keynan*
Becoming an American citizen through naturalization requires taking the Oath of Allegiance, loudly. The first part of the Oath of Allegiance reads, “I hereby declare, on oath, that I absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty of whom or which I have heretofore been a subject or citizen.” Mr. Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo did exactly that when he took the Oath of Allegiance and became a US citizen some 30 years ago. On 8 February 2017, he was elected President of the Federal Republic of Somalia (FGS).
President Farmaajo is not alone. His administration is packed with diaspora Somalis holding dual citizenship, who returned from Europe, North America, and Australia. Diaspora Somalis from these continents represent less than 30 percent of the estimated 2 million Somali immigrants abroad; and about 5 percent of the total Somali population.  However, politically they disproportionately dominate state institutions, at federal and state levels. For our purpose here, attention will be devoted to the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS). Details are sketchy, as government officials do not feel or believe that they ought to disclose their association with foreign powers through citizenship or any other affiliation. Nevertheless, information compiled from different sources indicates that they have established and maintain a firm foothold in all branches of the Federal Government (FG), especially the executive and legislature. Below are details concerning representation of dual citizenship holders in the FG when the formation of President Farmaajo’s administration was completed in March last year.


The American Camp: Somali-Americans occupy the most powerful position in the Federal Government of Somalia. The President of the Federal Republic of Somalia, who is also the head-of-state and Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, leads the Camp. It also includes holders of important cabinet posts: Minister of Finance, Minister of Religious Affairs, Minister of Women and Human Rights, and Minister of Fisheries. American citizens of Somali origin also hold other important positions in the Federal Government. 

The Norwegian Colony: Norwegian citizens of Somali origin prominently feature in the business of the FGS.  They occupy two of the top three most powerful positions in the country: The Prime Minister/Head-of-Government and Speaker of the People’s Assembly. In addition, they hold the positions of the Minister of Defence and Minister of Education and Culture. A few are members of the Federal Parliament.

The Canadian Corner: Somali-Canadians preside over the largest number of ministerial portfolios, including some of most coveted posts in the cabinet. They are: Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Constitutional Affairs, Minister of Planning, Minister of Transport and Aviation, and Minister of Labour. 
Lone-star portfolios: Dual citizens hailing from Australia, Britain, Denmark, Nederland, and Sweden also hold cabinet posts. Each has one ministerial position: Energy & Water, Health, Posts, Telecom & Technology, Disaster response, and Internal Security, respectively. 

Concerns about dual citizenship: divided loyalties and conflict of interests

Acquiring dual citizenship is a personal decision. It bestows a variety of opportunities and benefits on the holder. Most importantly, it is perfectly legal according to the Provisional Constitution (PC) of Somalia. However, countries vary greatly when it comes to laws governing dual citizenship. Some reject it completely, while others permit dual citizenship with certain conditions and restrictions. It becomes particularly problematic when dual citizens seek and/or hold the highest public offices in a country. Concerns about dual citizens holding high political office primarily emanate from issues related to divided loyalties and conflict of interests.
Even big and powerful countries warn their citizens not to rush to professing allegiance to a foreign power. According to an editorial piece by the Los Angeles Times (December 26, 2014) the U.S. State Department warns American citizens from ‘retaining or applying for citizenship in another country.’ The most important reason given is that dual citizenship could be seen as a security threat, creating a situation in which dual citizens could be barred from obtaining employment in some diplomatic and intelligence/security positions considered to be highly sensitive.  More recently, issues relating to dual citizenship have turned Australian politics topsy-turvy as many MPs lost their parliamentary positions for failing to disclose and renounce their status as dual citizens before they stood for election. In Ukraine, a country in which more than 100 members of parliament are dual citizens, MPs “flaunt the laws of the country, route their money into hidden accounts in tax havens, and generally enrich themselves at their country’s expense,” according to an article published on Forbes webpage (July 31, 2017). The article also mentions the case of a former Prime Minister who was travelling on a foreign passport and detained in Switzerland ‘for money laundering,’ and that of another senior official in the Ukrainian fiscal service, who ‘may be tried in Britain on corruption charges due to his British Citizenship.’ The practice in most countries is that dual citizens are either barred from occupying top national leadership positions, or they voluntarily renounce their second citizenship. 

The special case of Somalia
The situation in Somalia is both different and rare. Somalia has just started the process of moving out of the degrading and deeply humiliating legacy of a failed state. Its Provisional Constitution (PC) is in disarray and highly contested. In fact, the Somali people have not been consulted about the provisions in the PC that allow dual citizenship.  Its institutions are fragile and extremely vulnerable to infiltration, destabilization, corruption, and even takeover by internal usurpers and/or external predators with vested strategic, geopolitical, or business interests. Moreover, dual citizens have and wield immense executive and legislative powers in a context characterized by lack of accountability and transparency, coupled with debilitating capacity limitations. How these enormous powers are used or abused and in favour of whom and against whom is therefore a matter of utmost importance. Somalis and informed foreigners who closely follow the events unfolding in the country express concerns that are many, deep, and legitimate.
Domination of power: There is not any country in Africa or elsewhere where so much power is concentrated in so few individuals with dual citizenship. The numbers are staggering. Access to the reigns of power is quick, easy and unfettered for dual citizenship. They hardly go through appropriate background checks. This has become a source of frustration and resentment among non-diaspora Somalis, who feel exploited and marginalized in their own country. Current events indicate a disturbing trend regarding the manner in which state power and authority has been exercised. Contrary to the principles of the PC, the power and resources of the state are concentrated in a few federal entities based in Mogadishu, causing a huge and deepening crisis between the FGS and Federal Member States (FMS). This is a serious, even dangerous, matter which, if not resolved, could squander the limited gains made, or even cause the entire fragile federal edifice to collapse.
Obsession with external legitimacy: There is evidence that the FGS looks towards external powers for legitimacy. This is bizarre in the context of established norms underlying state sovereignty and legitimacy. But in the peculiar and befuddled state of Somalia, it is seen as a normal practice. Since the presence and authority of the Federal Government across the country are very thin or non-existent, it finds it easier and more convenient to seek and depend on external actors not only for legitimacy but also for resources. The UN, EU, World Bank, IMF, AMISOM, IGAD, AU, UAE, USA, UK, Qatar, Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti have replaced the Somali people as the principal source of legitimacy for the Federal Government of Somalia. Shuttle visits to and weekends in Nairobi, Dubai, Ankara, Brussels, Washington, Addis Ababa, Kampala, Riyad, and Cairo have become easier and more frequent than spending time with and serving the citizens in Baidoa, Kismayo, Brava, Marka, Jowhar, Beledweyn, Dhusamareb, Galkayo, Garow, and Bosaso. Somaliland does not even feature in the business of the FGS except when Somaliland authorities seek or secure promising investment deals and development opportunities. Success and progress are measured in terms of pledges from the EU, promises from the World Bank, projects from the UN, and secret deals with both sides in the messy and deepening conflict in the Gulf.
Corruption and scramble for Somalia’s strategic assets: The strategically located Horn of Africa region is in the throes of a new and fierce scramble. Somalia is at once a strategic beachhead for the new, enterprising mission; and a principal target if the price is right. The new scramble for Somalia involves a wide range of competitors. The motives and interests of the scramblers vary greatly, as are the tools, narratives, capabilities, and resources deployed in the service of the business. The scramblers have their eyes focused on the country’s main strategic assets: ports, airports, marine resources, and areas with promising oil and mineral wealth. There is also a tough competition for other lucrative sectors, especially security, logistics, infrastructure, and service provision. As indicated in recent reports, the country is being fleeced openly and with total impunity. Diaspora Somalis have been implicated in a number of dubious, even illegal, deals either as brokers, lobbyists, shareholders, or facilitators. Concerns are also expressed regarding attempts by powerful forces in the FGS to bend, pervert, or flaunt existing laws or tamper with new legislative endeavors in the service of greed and corruption.  The Institutions of the Federal Government of Somalia are saddled with a host of lethal afflictions. The one that is most pervasive and most corrosive is corruption, a scourge that the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Somalia and Head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) recently referred to as ‘horrendous.’ Reports from the UN, World Bank and other credible sources have documented in great detail the horrendous levels of corruption and embezzlement during the past seven years. These reports indicate that “70 percent of funds that had been earmarked for development and reconstruction in Somalia were unaccounted for.” On 2 March 2014 the Daily Nationin Kenya published a summary of an audit report that alleged an estimated $700 million, mostly from Arab countries, basically ended up in the pockets of senior government officials between 2000 and 2013.

Role of the International Community


For over a quarter century, the International Community (IC) has dominated the affairs of Somalia and the lives and future of Somali people. Billions have been spent to help Somalia navigate the arduous journey form protracted and bloody civil war, to failed state, to transitional state, to fragile state, and finally to a fully sovereign but bankrupt state. This was an unprecedented engagement and a rare experiment in the annals of international cooperation. For the IC, cracking the Somali conundrum has been a constant and messy struggle, involving a great deal of experimentation and improvisation. Some progress has been made. But the achievements have been too little, too slow, and uneven. Most importantly, there is very little to show for the billions of dollars spent to date. A huge chunk of the financial resources earmarked for the country went into the pockets of private individuals and groups many of whom occupied top leadership positions in the government. Things are so bad that ordinary Somalis are beginning to doubt if they have a country any more. The current government has made serious efforts to address the scourge of corruption that blighted the country for decades. However, given the combined and deadly impact of weak government, fragile institutions, and powerful and entrenched networks of corruption, it is hard to even contemplate a satisfactory resolution anytime soon. It is therefore high time for the IC, the UN in particular, to realize that it cannot continue financing an expensive fiction forever. The monster the IC has been feeding and protecting for more than two decades might end up destroying whatever is left of its credibility and integrity, and in the process leave an entire nation feeling humiliated, betrayed, and and profoundly angry.
© 2018 Hassan Keynan
keynanhassan@yahoo.com
/by

Soomaaliya: Qaran baadigoobaya qaacidda xukun (Governance Formula)

Hassan A. Keynan
Soomaliya waa qaran baadigoobaya qaacidda xukun oo ay uga soo kaban karto qaran-jabkii ba’naa iyo jahawareerka siyaasadeed ee ragaadiyay. Habka xukun ee dalka ka jira waxaa saldhig u ah saddex nidaam oo ku kala abtirsada isirro iyo hiddooyin kala duwan aadna u kala fog: 1) qaaciddada Afar iyo Bar(4.5 Formula) ee lagu guddomiyay Carta, Jabuuti sannadkii 2000, 2) Dastuurka Ku-Meel Gaarkaoo lagu soo allifay Nayroobi, Kenya, 2004tii, laguna ansixiyey Muqdisho, Soomaaliya,  bishii Agoosto  2012kii, iyo Shareecada Islaamka.
Afar iyo Bar (A&B) waa qaaciddo awood qaybsi. Waxaa saldhig u ah abtirsiimo. Waxaa saamilay ka ah beelo lagu soo koobay afar beel iyo bar.  Afarta beel ee waawayn (clan family) waxaa loo qoondeeyay qaybo is le’eg. Beesha shanaadna waxaa loo gartay hal beel oo afarta beel ka mid ah intay heshay nuskeed. Qaaciddadan waa mid ku dhisan is-afgard iyo tijaabo ku salaysan is-ku-day iyo arag-hadday-shaqayso. Afkaarteeda iyo axkaamteeda meelna kuma qorna; marjac suganna ma laha. Dhaqan siyaasadeed iyo hiddo awoodqaybsi oo soo jireen ahna kama soo jeeddo.  Sida ay ii sheegeen rag ka qayb galay Shirkii Carta, sababta ugu wayn ee A&B loo go’aandsaday waxay ahayd ‘xal raadis.’ A&B waa ‘xal ee xaq ma aha’ ayaa hal-ku-dhig u ahaa aabbayaashii curiyay qaaciddadan. 
Dastuurka Ku-Meel Gaarka (DKMG) asal ahaan wuxuu ka soo jeedaa nidaamkii laga dhaxlay gumaystayaashii Yurub. Udub dhexaadkiisu waa fikirka federaalka ah ee lagu guddoomiyay Nairobi, Kenya, 2004tii. 
Awoodda wuxuu siinayaa ‘shacabka,’ oo ka kooban muwaadiniin (citizens) xor ah. Wuxuu hoosta ka xarriiqayaa dimuqraadiyad, matalaad dhab ah, iyo caddaalad bulsho; oo ku salaynayaa ‘mabaadi’da asaasiga ah ee awood qaybsiga Nidaamka Federaalka.’ DKMG wuu qoranyahay. Wuxuu ku abtirsadaa afkaar iyo hiddooyin dastuuri ah oo asal ahaan Yurub ka soo jeeda. 
Sidii A&B kii Carta, DKMG, gaar ahaan nidaamka federaalka, waxaa loo muujiyay qaaciddo xal u keeni karta siyaasadda murugsan ee dalka; saldhigna u noqon karta awood qaybsi sinnaan iyo caddaalad ku dhisan. 
Shareecada Islaamka (SI)Waxaa saldhig u ah diinta Islaamka. Islaamku waa aasaaska jiritaanka, magaca, taariikhda, dhaqanka, ilbaxnimada, iyo ummadnimada isirka Soomaalida. Shareecadu waa nidaamka iyo qaaciddada xukun ee bulshada Soomaaliyeed ay ugu aqoon badan tahay, ugu  kalsooni badan tahay, marjacna u ah. Guri walba iyo gole walba oo gayiga Soomaaliyeed ka jira waxaa gogol iyo minhaj nololeed u ah Islaamka. Isir iyo qaran Soomaaliyeed ma jireen mana jiri karo Islaam la’aantii. Laga soo billaabo 1991dii, Soomaaliya markay ugu rajada badnayd waxay ahayd muddadii koobnayd ee Maxaakiimta Isaamiga ah ay dalka ka talinayeen. Dastuurka Ku-Meel Gaarka ah meelo badan ayuu ku xusaya diinta Islaamka. Tusaale ahaan, Qodobka 2(3) wuxuu tilmaamayaa inaan la soo saari karin “sharci aan waafaqsaneyn Mabaadi’da guud ee Shareecada Islaamka iyo Maqaasiiddeeda.” 
Qodobka 3(1) wuxuu sheegayaa “Dastuurka Soomaaliya waxaa saldhig u ah Qur’aanka kariimka ah iyo Sunnada Nabigeenna Muxammed (NNKH), wuxuuna ilaalinayaa maqaasidda (ujeeddooyinka) shareecada iyo caddaaladda bulshada.” 
Hase yeeshee, DKMG xooggiisu wuxuu ku salaysan yahay aragtiyo iyo mabaadi’ cilmaani ah oo ku abtirsada hiddo dastuuri oo ka soo jeedda qaaradda Yurub; badankkoduna aannay is-waafaqayn diinta iyo Shareecada Islaamka. 
Labadan nidaam ee hore midna ujeeddoyinkii loo cimaamaday laguma gaadhin. A&B xalkii la lahaa way keeni, lama hayo. Waxaabad mooddaa inay wax sii xumaysay. Xaqna markii horeba lagama filayn, loogamana fadhiyin. DKMG waxoogaa horumar ah ayuu keenay. Waxaa lagu dhisay Baarlamaanka Federaalka (BF). Wuxuu saldhig u ahaa yagleelidda dawlad goboleedyada xubnaha ka ah Dawladda Federaalka Soomaaliya (DFS). Laba madaxwayne ayaa lagu soo doortay. Hase yeeshee, DKMG ma noqon mid suuragaliya dib-u-heshiisiin dhab ah iyo dawlad nabad iyo caddaalad lagu helo. Wuxuuba dhaliyay dhibaatooyin cusub iyo is-mariwaa la xiriira siddii loo wadaagi lahaa awoodaha siyaasadeed iyo khyaraadka dalka. Intaa waxaa u dheer, DKMG waa qabyo, dhmmaystirkiisana waxaa la hadal hayay laguna hawlanaa in ka badan lix sano. Waxaase ugu daran oo noqotay hooyadii jahawareerka, markii Guddoomiye-ku-xigeenka koobaad ee BF, ahna Guddomiyaha ku-meel-gaarka ah, uu dorraad sheegay in Dastuurkii asalka ahaa ee in ka badan 800 ergo ah ay ansixiyeen 2012kii la la’yahay; midka hadda lagu socdana uu yahay mid an sax ahayn oo af Ingiriis lagu qoray dabeedna Soomaali loo turjumay. Guddoomiyuhu ma uusan sheegin goorta uu lumay Dastuurkii aslaka ahaa ama waqtiga uu ogaaday inuu maqanyahay. Arrinta Guddoomiyuhu uu ka dhawaajiyay waa arrin halis ah, waxaana ka dhalan kara shiddooyin dastuuri ah (constitutional crises). Tusaale, ma dastuur aan sax ahayn ayaa lagu soo doortay Madaxawaynaha 8dii Febraayo 2017?
Nidaamka saddexaad, Shareecada Islaamka (SI), kooxda keliya ee si cad ugu doodda in Shareecada waddanka lagu xukumo waa urur diimmedka hubaysan ee Al-Shabab. Meelaha ay dalka ka taliyaanna Shareecada inay ku maamulaan ayay sheegtaan. Xogo lagu kalsoonaan karo ayaa jira oo sheegayaa in meelo badan oo ka mid ah koonfurta dalka, gaar ahaan Muqdisho iyo nawaaxigged, ay dad badani nidaamka maamul iyo garsoor ee Xukuumadda Federaalka ka door bidaan kuwa Al-Shabab. Caddaaladda AS waxaa lagu tilmaamaa “caddaalad arxan darro ah”. Dad badanina waxay aaminsanyihiin in maamulka iyo caddaaladda AS ay yihiin kuwo aad uga fog Shareecada iyo dhaqanka diinta Islaamka. Hase yeeshee, tabar yarida, masuuliyad darrada, iyo musuqmaasuqa ba’aan ee Xukuumadda Federaalka iyo xoogagga shisheeye ee la bahda ah ayaa sababay in dadka qaar miciin bidaan xukunka arxandarrada ah ee AS.
Sidaa darted waxaa lagama maarmaan ah in la yagleelo qaaciddo xukun oo lagaga gudbo xaaladda cakkiran ee uu dalku ku jiro. Waa muhim la iska illoobo afkaarta iyo habdhaqanka caadiga ah ee dalka iyo dawladda ragaadiyay, lalana yimaaddo dardar iyo dhiirranaan. Aragtiyo cusub iyo is-beddel waa lama huraan si xal wa-ku-ool ah loo helo. Talooyinka soo soccda, waa kuwo qaddarin mudan, lagana yaabo inay soo dhaweeyaan xal la mahadiyo.
1.    Sharci degdega: Iyadoo la raacayo hab dastuuri ah ama tub kale oo daahfuran oo xal lagu raadinayo, Labada Aqal ee barlamaanka Federaalka (BF) oo la tashanaya baarlammaannada dawlad goboleedyada, ha qabanqaabiyo soo jeedin wax lagaga beddelayo DKMG, gaar ahaan laamaha fulinta iyo garsoorka.
2.    Laanta Fulinta (Executive Branch): Jagada Madaxwaynaha waxaa lagu  beddeli karaa Gole Federaal (Federal Council) oo matala dawlad goboleedyada iyo Caasimadda. Waxaa magacaabaya mudanayaasha Labada AAal ee Barlamaanka Federaalka. Golaha Federaalka wuxuu noqonayaa awoodda fulinta ee dalka ugu sarraysa. Afartii sanaba mar ayaa la dooranayaa. Xubnaha Golaha Federaalka waxay yeelanayaa awood siman, waxayna wax ku go’aaminayaan talo wadaag. Sannadba mid ayaa guddoomiye loo dooranyaa. Mugga iyo awoodaha dawladda Federaalka waxay noqonayaan kuwo kooban oo xaddidan.
3.    Laanta Garsoorka(Judicial Branch): Labada Aqal ee BF ha lagu wareejiyo awoodda magacaabidda guddoomiyaha Maxkamadda Dastuuriga, Maxkamadda Sare iyo garsooreyaasha kale Heer-Federaal. Sida la ogayahay DKMG wuxuu awooddan siinayaa Madaxwaynaha. Shan sano iyo bar kadibna Maxkammadda Dastuuriga lama samayn. Hay’adaha garsoorku intooda kalena caga badan kuma taagna. Maa daama bulshada Soomaaliyeed ay hiddo u leeyihiin kalsooni buuxdana ku qabaan ku dhaqanka Shareecada, waxaa habboon in gundhig looga dhigo garsoorka dalka, gaar ahaan kan madaniga ah.
4.    Gole sare oo nabadayn iyo dib-u-heshiisiin ka shaqeeya: Labada Aqal ee BF ha magacaabaan Gole Sare oo ka shaqeeya nabadayn iyo dib-u-heshiisiin dhab ah, toosna u hoos yimaadda BF. Xubnaha golaha waxaa laga soo xulayaa culimada magac ku leh dalka, oday dhaqameedyo iyo duubab ciso iyo sharaf leh, aqoonyahanno khibrad leh kana madax bannaan xaglin siyaasadeed iyo damac hunguri, iyo siyaasiyiin lago bartay u istaagidda danta guud iyo difaaca qaranka. Hawlaha golaha waxaa lagu soo koobayaa xal-u-raadinta mushkiladaha waawayn ee dalka ragaadiyay, sida:
·     Al-Shabaab
·     Khilaafaadka dastuuriga ah ee ka dhexeeya DFS iyo dawlad goboleedyada
·     Arrinta Somaliland
·     Qorshe lagu soo afjaro joogidda iyo hawlgallada xoogagga ajnabiga dalka jooga.
Waa hubaal in aanay hawshan ahayn mid fudud. Waxaa jira xoogag ka hor iman doona, oo u arka in danahooda gaarka ah ay ku waayi karaan. Waxaa jiri kara shaqsiyaad iyo kooxo shaki ka qaba in is-beddelka noocan ah uu noqon karo mid xal keena; sidaa darteedna jecel in sida hadda la yahaya la sii ahaado. Waxaa jira xoogag shisheeya oo mushkiladda Soomaaliya u arka sac irmaan oo ay abid maalaan. 
Xoogagga hor iman doona ama shaki ka qaba fikradahan iyo is-beddellada ka iman kara, gaar ahaan Soomaalida, waxaa habboon waajibna ah in la waydiiyo su’aalahan jawaabaha ay ka bixiyaanna la qiimeeyo.
1. Al-Shabaab(AS): Cudud ciidan ma looga adkaan karaa? Dawladda Federaalka, Dawlad Goboleedyada, iyo tobannaanka kun ee ciidamada shisheeye ee dalka ku sugan xal ciidan ma ku dhammayn karaan massibada AS? Xaqiiqdu waxay tahay: Kadib12 sano, afar madaxwayne, labaatan kun oo ciidamo ajnabi ah, iyo duqayn iyo hawlgallo khaas ah oo ay si joogta ah u fuliso dawladda adduunka ugu quwad wayn, ma suuragalin in masiibada Al-Shabaab cudud militari lagu xalliyo. 
2.    Laanta fulinta ee uu madaxwaynuhu hoggaamiyo: xal waara oo caadila ma u heli kartaa khilaafaadka ka dhexeeya DFS iyo dawlad goboleedyada, isla markaana ma leedahay awooddii iyo agabyadii uu ku hirgalin lahayd? Madaxwaynuhu waa shaqsi keliya. Dal iyo dad kala qaybsan xoogag shisheeyana ay ku loollamayaan xoog iyo cudud uu ku mideeyo kuna daafaco ma laha. Sida muuqatana, kuwi ka horreeyay dariiqii ay mareen ayuu ku taagan yahay.
3.    Somaliland:qaddiyadda Somaliland waxay soo tagnayd 28 sano. Muddadaa waxaa Somalia soo maray 6 madaxwayne iyo 15 ra’isul wasaare. Midkoodna Hargeisa iyo Berbera ma tegin mana tegi karin. Madaxwayne Farmaajo iyo Raisul Wasaare Khayre iyana ma tegin mana tegi karaan.  Waa maxay xikmadda ku jirta in Madaxwayne iyo Raisul Wasaare aan Muqdishu oo ay dhexjoogaan xukumin ay la soo taagnaadaan Berbera oo aany tegi karin ayaan xukunna? Madaxda iyo siyaasiyiinta Muqdisho jooga waxaad mooddaa inay u haystaan dadka iyo qaddiyada  Somaliland inay ka yimaadeen cirjiirka Maaris. Qaarkoodna maba fahamsana taariikhda qaddiyada meesha taalla, iyo halist ka iman kartaa haddii la sahlado. Siyaasiyiinta Somaliland qaarkoodna meel soke ayay wax ka eegaan, umana muuqdo ama way iska indha tirayaan sawirka wayn iyo mugdiga gudaha wayn ee ku hareeraysan.
4.    Ciidamada AMISOM:Ciidamada AMISOM iyo xoogagga kale ee shisheeye ee dalka ka hawl gala toban sano ayay dalka joogeen. Maxaa uga soo xasilay Soomaaliya? Maxaa kaga lumiyay? Joogistooda aan waqti xaddidan lahayn ma dan bay u tahay dalka? Mise shiddooyinka jira ayay qayb ka tahay? 

keynanhassan@yahoo.com
/by

A beautiful tyranny misnamed partnership – A Poem

A beautiful tyranny misnamed partnership

The relationship
To which we are wedded
Is a beautiful tyranny
Misnamed partnership.
Our partnership
Is a partnership of unequal partners
Of unequal powers and unequal opportunities
A partnership honeycombed
With labyrinths of genteel deception, division and exclusion.
In our partnership
One party represents
An imperial order of unprecedented sway and intrigue
Into whose hegemonic bosom
The other is conveniently entombed.
In our partnership
One party is the source, centre and symbol
Of all knowledge, civilisation and salvation
The other a mere consumer
Of high culture and QUIPs[1].
We are stakeholders in a bizarre covenant
That folds enslavement
In intoxicating benevolence and grace
Our partnership is afflicted with saintly inhumanity.
In the cold mathematics of our partnership
Our partnership is our destiny.
Amen.
© 1995 Hassan Keynan
Keynan, Hassan, (1995). A tyranny misnamed partnership. First published in: Brock Utne, Birgit, 2000: Whose Education for All? The Re-colonisation of the African mind? New York/London: Falmer Press.

    [1] Quick impact projects.

/by

Can Somali sovereignty and unity be saved? Analysis and recommendations

Can Somali sovereignty and unity be saved? Analysis and recommendations

Hassan A. Keynan*
Somalia has been blighted by decades of strife and seemingly endless political instability and chaos. The reasons for this tragic state of affairs are many, complex, multi-dimensional and immensely variegated. A complete and comprehensive investigation of what went wrong and why would not possible in this brief account. However, a few factors warrant particular attention.

First, the 2000 Arta Charter that introduced the 4.5 power-sharing formula, the 2004 Nairobi Charter that promulgated the federal system, and the Provisional Constitution (PC) that was adopted in Mogadishu in 2012, were all political and legal documents that were initiated, negotiated and rolled out in ways and under circumstances characterized by haste, secrecy, manipulation, and excessive control by external actors. In fact, all were crafted outside Somalia, under the sponsorship and patronage of foreign countries, including some with longstanding strategic and geopolitical ambitions in the country. The Somali people had not been invited. Nor had they been able to effect direct participation on their own initiative. More importantly, these frameworks are fraught with concepts and principles that are contradictory, and at times, conflicting. Members of the Federal Parliament have repeatedly spoken about the fundamental flaws in the Provisional Constitution. Many have pointed out that the inadequacies and contradictions in the PC are so many and so deep that at least 50% of the document ought to be overhauled so as to make it workable. Some have argued that key articles of the PC have been tampered with.

Second, efforts and projects aimed at completing the PC have been going on for more than six years. This was the principal responsibility tasked with President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and his administration, and they spectacularly failed. The current President and his team are already in their second year; and it seems unlikely that they would be successful. Even if President Farmaajo’s administration manages to tackle this difficult issue, it is not clear if it would make any difference in solving the deepening political crises facing the country.

Third, the complex and messy situation the country is in presently is not one that can be adequately managed or overcome with the help of the PC and/or the half-baked initiatives and policies put forward by the Federal Government. The Provisional Constitution proffers beautiful words and loft ideals imagining a nation and people that are free, united, and sovereign. And the Federal Government seems to be hell-bent on drawing its legitimacy and the legality of its powers and authority solely on the basis of these imaginary notions. However, the hard truth is that the magical words in the PC and the raft of powers and privileges it bestows on federal constitutional bodies and office bearers are in actual reality a mirage.
Somalia is in the throes of an unprecedented scramble rarely, and probably never, witnessed in the history of post-colonial Africa. The new scramble for Somalia involves a wide range of competitors: Internal and external, national and international, old and new, traditional and modern, state and non-state, local and diaspora, religious and secular, African and Arab. They include:
  • ·       The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS).
  • ·       Somaliland, which has chartered and pursued its own path with a measure of credibility and success.
  • ·       Five Federal Member States (FMS) with huge variations in stability, governance, and economy.
  • ·       Two armed religious groups, Al-Shabab (AS) and Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama (ASWJ).
  • ·       The Banadir Region.
  • ·       Four clan families and half.
  • ·       Ubiquitous and nimble diaspora Somalis in search of opportunity and fortune.
  • ·       More than 20,000 foreign soldiers.
  • ·       Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and United Arab Emirates.
  • ·       Kenya and Ethiopia both of which harbor long-standing and well-known agendas in Somalia.
  • ·       The international community with its own sequestered enclave inside the International Airport in the Capital.


The Federal Government is probably the weakest in terms of the resources and capabilities it can mobilize and effectively deploy in defense of the territory it claims to control and the unity and sovereignty of the nation. Yet, the FGS insists that it is the only national legitimate authority in the land; and that any action or transaction implemented across the country without its consent and approval is illegal. This type of calculation is unrealistic as it flies in the face realities on the ground, or even common sense. The President, Prime Minister, or Speaker of Parliament cannot visit Berbera or Hargeisa; and their authority and directives do not reach or get meaningfully implemented there and much of the territories under the control of the FMS and AS. They cannot even control the Capital or freely move on its roads. Recently, the executives of the Federal Member States (FMS) claimed that they control 90 percent of the country while the FGS has effective jurisdiction on only 10 percent.  This speaks volumes about the multiplicity of challenges and debilitating constraints with which the FGS is saddled.
How, then, a country confronting such lethal afflictions be salvaged? Is it realistically possible to save its sovereignty and unity? These are questions for which there are not easy, definitive answers. At the same time, if there is will, patience and courage, it is quite possible to crack the conundrum.

Recommendations that could save the country

1.     The Provisional Constitution and the 4.5 Formula: These frameworks are part of the problem. And it is unlikely that they can be part of any durable solution. Therefore, instead of wasting valuable time and precious resources on fixing the deeply flawed PC or implement the accursed, unworkable 4.5 Formula, it is of utmost important to steer the country in a new direction, with emphasis placed on exploring and experimenting with new, ambitious, and creative innovations in constitution-making. Such efforts must be informed by the unique history, traditions and heritage of the country; the context and realities on the ground; and appropriate and relevant regional and international principles. What Somalia and Somalis went through since 1991 is extremely rare. It would be hard to find any country caught up in such complex web of afflictions and vulnerabilities for such a long time. It is therefore important to move away from business-as-usual or quick fix approaches. What is needed is  a bold, well thought out governance formula befitting the peculiar nature of the country and the character and political culture of its people, and the contextual and geopolitical dynamics at work.  Somalis with the right mix of expertise, experience, and knowledge, and have the best interest of the country and people at heart should lead and conclude this effort, with little or no external involvement.  The outcome might well be a new, homegrown model of governance.
2.     A rotating federal presidency: From 1960, the year of independence and Union, Somalia has not had a president from Somaliland or Southwest. The three presidents and five prime ministers that led the country from their enclave in Mogadishu between 2008 and 2017, hailed from just two clans, even though the top politicians and legislators claim that the 4.5 formula is the principal power-sharing framework. This is neither fair nor sustainable, particularly in the context of a country torn apart by multiple, autonomous and competing clan-based fiefdoms, coupled with a weak federal government unable to unite the country either through legitimate force or enlightened leadership and peaceful negotiations.
3.     Relocating the Federal Parliament and the Supreme Court: In order to ensure that the three branches of government are operational and able to exercise their mandated constitutional duties and responsibilities fully and freely, it is worth considering relocating the legislative and judiciary arms outside the Capital, preferably in two different Federal Member States. Presently, Mogadishu lacks the minimum political, security, and logistical requirements for the Parliament and Supreme Court to operate smoothly and effectively. MPs are routinely targeted and intimidated, and many had already paid the ultimate price. In addition, the Executive Branch has engaged in authoritarian and at times unlawful practices aimed at intimidating, manipulating, or bribing MPs and judges often in the service of parochial and partisan interests. During the last two weeks we have watched the sad spectacle of the Speaker of the People’s Assembly accusing the Executive Branch of sending its security forces to seize the premises of the Federal Parliament. The proposed arrangements would not solve all the problems blighting the country. They could, however, serve as transitional measures to stabilize the country’s polarized and contested political landscape. More importantly, they could liberate the legislature and judiciary from the arbitrary, intrusive, strong-arm tactics of the Presidency based in Mogadishu.
4.     Genuine peace negotiations with Al-Shabab: An impressive and expensive array of military forces and arsenal has been mobilized and deployed against AS for over a decade. But achieving the often-stated objective of a complete and crushing military defeat over the insurgent group has proved elusive. Twelve years, three presidents, the security forces of the federal government and FMSs, over 20,000 foreign soldiers, and relentless and sustained air bombing and lightning special operations raids by the sole remaining super power, have failed to eliminate AS, although they have weakened its capabilities and diminished its ranks. And 12 more years of the same approach would most probably not achieve a different outcome. In fact, there is a growing consensus that pursuing an open-ended military strategy against AS, especially in the context of the expansive War on Terror project, would be a tragic and costly mistake. Informed Somalis know the conditions and circumstances that led to AS’s emergence and its continued existence. As long as those conditions persist, the prospects for resolving the protracted and destructive conflict would be bleak. A genuine, all-Somali initiative uncontaminated by foreign hands, interests, and agendas, is needed to craft and implement credible and realistic peace talks with AS.
5.     Limit the number of the diaspora and the positions they hold in the Federal Government: The profile and status of the politicians from the diaspora grew exponentially during the last parliamentary and presidential elections. By the time the process of government formation was completed in March, the diaspora had dominated the political landscape on a scale not seen in the history of post-colonial Africa. At the present time, the President, Prime Minister, Speaker of the Parliament, and 17 of 27 minsters in the Federal Government are Somalis who pledged loyalty to external powers. More than a third of the members of the 10th Parliament also hold foreign passports. The countries represented in the Federal Government include Australia, Britain, Canada, Denmark, Nederland, Sweden, and USA. Individuals from the diaspora, especially those with dual citizenship, have divided loyalty. In most countries an individual with dual nationality cannot become president of the nation. Dual citizenship holders are not even allowed to hold sensitive positions in areas pertaining to national security and strategic assets. In the case of Somalia, most diaspora have been away from the country for decades, and their connection with the country is flimsy. Many fly into Mogadishu in search of opportunity and fortune. In fact, they seem to be engaged in a new form of state capture in the interest of three main beneficiaries: individual diaspora members, the diaspora as a collective entity as a cabal, and the external actors with which they are affiliated through citizenship or other shared interest in that order. The modus operandi followed by most diaspora individuals seeking or holding public office seems to be: occupy every available space, grab every opportunity, share the spoils among fellow diaspora friends and family members, and coordinate and, at times even, collude with external powers, with the embassies of the countries whose passports they hold being the first port of call. There is not any country in the world where so many with dual nationality wield so much executive and legislative power. Such concentration of power and resources in the hands of a tiny group with extensive links with foreign powers does not help a country with fragile institutions that are extremely vulnerable to infiltration, destabilization, corruption, and even takeover by internal usurpers and/or external predators with vested strategic and geopolitical interests. More importantly, this sends a wrong message to the Somalis in the country, especially the youth hundreds of who risk life and limb fleeing the country in the hope of becoming tomorrow’s diaspora high fliers. Of course those hell-bent on seeking the highest national offices could do the right thing by renouncing their second nationality, as done in many countries.

What if the status quo remains the same?

Predicting Somalia’s future with a measure of certainty is fraught with difficulties. However, a great deal could be learned from the experiences and legacies of previous governments from 2000 to 2016.  All of them failed in achieving national reconciliation, restoring peace and stability, and defending the sovereignty and unity of the country.  The current government so far seems to be firmly grounded on the road taken by its four predecessors, barring any radical change of direction in the coming two and half years.  If the current trend persists for a decade or two, the following scenarios could unfold, with far-reaching consequences.
1.     Somaliland could move in two possible directions: Full, internationally recognized independence, or confederation with Ethiopia. A possible third scenario is that Ethiopia could be tempted to annex part or all of Somaliland. There are long-standing historical and geopolitical ambitions and interest informing these scenarios.
2.     Jubbaland and the federal government have so far managed an uneasy coexistence. But there are deeper tensions underlying the relationship.  During the reigns of Presidents Sheikh Sharif and Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, the federal government had vehemently opposed the establishment of Jubbaland Interim Administration, largely for reasons rooted in narrow, partisan politics. The same reasons underlie and to some extent animate the approach of President Farmaajo’s government to Jubbaland. Jubbaland could therefore find itself confronting a few, tight and invariably unattractive options: maintain the status quo with emphasis placed on strengthening its position vis-a-vis Mogadishu; move closer to Kenya politically and economically; or formally seek the protection of Ethiopia. It is worth noting here that the Interim Administration of Jubbaland was inaugurated in Addis Ababa in a deal between the Federal Government and Jubbaland brokered by Ethiopia.
3.     The country could break into six emirates or six trust territories under the protection of foreign powers.
4.     New round of hostilities between clans, between the federal government and FMS, between FMSs, and between Al-Shabab and all other forces in the country.

There are elaborate schemes to reconfigure, politically and geographically, parts of the Middle East, the Arabian Peninsula, and the Horn of Africa led by Saudi Arabia and UAE, in collaboration with Ethiopia and with the tacit approval of a major western power.  Implementation of this scheme has already begun in Yemen. A core element of this scheme is to bring the strategic assets – ports, airports, and oil and gas fields – in the Horn of Africa under “Ethiopia’s leadership.” This new, aggressive and well-resourced scramble for Somalia cannot be countered with the amateur reactions, empty rhetoric, and duplicitous silence of those entrusted with the responsibility of defending the nation. If the top leaders of the country do not take their duty seriously and act accordingly and timely, they will wake up too late, alone and without a country.
Author and poet

keynanhassan@yahoo.com
/by